All of Nietzsche’s criticisms of the normative component of MPSare parasitic upon one basic complaint — not, as some have held(e.g., Nehamas [1985], Geuss [1997]), the universality of moraldemands, per se, but rather that “the demand of onemorality for all is detrimental to the higher men” (BGE 228).Universalit… Nietzsche does none of this.”Aside from Nietzsche’s resistance against universal codes and rules, there is also the issue that he wants people to choose, develop and expand healthy, vital instincts, so that people can function and make decisions swiftly and automatically by relying on their (healthy and vital) subconscious. To injure, exploit, commit violence upon one’s true peers, it seems, lacks “good manners” (BGE 259). When Nietzsche uses the word “moral” he *means* “a code which regards itself as requiring something absolutely, and not as a means to some other end.” So on this intrinsicist construal of the concept of morality, Rand would also be rejecting “morality.” (Note how Nietzsche’s account of what morality *is* resembles Kant’s, though Nietzsche rejects what Kant accepts here).“Morality seems bound up with obligation, with codes and rules, and somehow I don’t see the ‘blond beasts of prey’ kowtowing to rules (any more than to a social contract)” (GM ii.17).The paradigm of “master morality”: the Romans (GM I.16). This raises the interesting question: Can there be subconscious moralities?”I appreciate the counterintuitiveness of saying that Nietzsche, who talks constantly about morality, and who continually judges and evaluates, was uninterested in articulating a proper moral code.
This implies that morals are effects, not causes. The Roman appreciation for order, courtesy, etc., while avoiding the bad conscience, is possible, on Nietzsche’s view, precisely because the aggressive stuff finds outlet elsewhere--in war, pillage, etc. In this video we investigate Nietzsche's views on morality by contrasting the higher man and the herd. So it is important to not miss the *complexity* of the analysis and resist the temptation to reduce it to two columns.“Most interesting of all, though, is the point of the passage as a whole, which is that ‘there are altogether no moral facts’” (1).Again, I think that this is best understood as “there are no irreducible, independent of consequence, or function absolute obligations.” That leaves open the possibility that certain rules might be useful for generating certain results (including certain kinds of people), the value of which may very well be “objective.”“But, finally, and moreover, Nietzsche seems fundamentally uninterested in discovering rules or guidelines for the improvement or best conduct of modern people. The answer seems to be that there is a natural sort of good will between persons whose power is roughly equal (GM ii.8; BGE 259, 265).
And this may explain why Nietzsche did not look for moral rules for everyone, and was not a moralist--and why this by itself does not disqualify him from having a morality.I’m not saying that Nietzsche necessarily had a morality, only that this question cannot be settled by the method and type of questions/arguments used by David above.Thomas Gramstad writes: “Aside from Nietzsche’s resistance against universal codes and rules, there is also the issue that he wants people to choose, develop and expand healthy, vital instincts, so that people can function and make decisions swiftly and automatically by relying on their (healthy and vital) subconscious.
But let us just remind ourselves that “the essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy [includes that it] accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings who, The context of these passages shows that they are meant politically; it is not just “spiritual” domination that is in question.
The strong, even in society, must violate and brutalize other people in order to stay living and vital, since that So the answer to the question how the masters can be civil is, first, that they But where does this sense of decorum come from? These are values Nietzsche never treats as arbitrary and which he assumes his men of the future will vindicate (GM ii.24; cf. Present conduct produces the future man.Kevin writes: “‘But, finally, and moreover, Nietzsche seems fundamentally uninterested in discovering rules or guidelines for the improvement or best conduct of modern people. For Nietzsche, a morality is inseparable from the culture which Nietzsche defined master morality as the morality of the strong-willed. However, that should not blind us to the fact that usually the context shows that he Though I applaud the emphasis that Nietzsche’s notion of “slavery” in this context is not merely spiritual, matters become muddled when we ask what he means in acknowledging the existence of “slavery” in a cruder sense. First, an ‘empirical’ reason: we don’t see him moralize. If this passage is taken in conjunction with the passage on the inevitable triumph of the forces of privatization over the state in Kevin Hill writes (I’ve edited slightly): “...the passage on the inevitable triumph of the forces of privatization over the state in Your response is reasonable enough.
I trust I will be forgiven if, at my present state of reading, it strikes me as quixotic. And they have a very lively appreciation of property rights, rules, obligations, etc., as Nietzsche knew well (the entire American political system could be said to be a further development of the Roman Republican model). Nietzsche condemns the triumph of slave morality in the West, saying that the democratic movement is the "Nietzsche did not necessarily believe that everyone should adopt master morality as the "be-all, end-all" behavior. There wouldn’t suddenly arise Martian or Alpha Centaurian mutant master moralities out of nowhere. It doesn’t look like one gets to be noble by adhering to the right code; rather, I disagree with this.